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FERMENT AND EXPERIMENT IN NEW YORK:
JUVENILE CASES IN THE NEW
FAMILY COURT
Nanette Dembitzt
The juvenile court is now in the third stage in the cycle of social re-
form: reforms, regrets, and revisions. In the past decade legislative com-
missions in a number of states have been evaluating the realities of the
vision of the early 1900's, of a court to help children.1 One of the more
thoroughgoing studies was New York's. It resulted in a completely re-
structured juvenile court law, which is incorporated in New York's new
Family Court Act.2
The New York Family Court Act changed the procedures relating to
juveniles, at the same time as it created a new court with a new combina-
tion of jurisdiction. A "Family Court" is intended to have jurisdiction
over the variety of actions rooted in family relationships or family
deterioration that are conventionally divided among a number of civil
and criminal courts-adoptions, matrimonial actions, paternity, support
of dependents, child" custody, minor crimes among family members, and
juvenile cases-to name the chief categories.'
t B.A., University of Michigan, 1933; LL.B., Columbia Law School, 1937. Member
of the New York Bar and of the Bar of the United States Supreme Court. The author
became familiar with the subject of this article through her work with the Advisory
Council of Judges of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, through her
activities on several bar association committees, and through her service as counsel to
the New York Civil Liberties Union.
1 In an early, now classic, statement, the aim of the juvenile court was "not so much to
punish as to reform"; the child was not viewed as guilty, but "either the unwillingness or
inability of the natural parents to guide it toward good citizenship has compelled the inter-
vention of the public authorities"; and the judge was not to determine whether he had
"committed a specific wrong, but what is he, how has he become what he is, and what
had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state ... ." Mack, "The Juvenile
Court," 23 Harv. L. Rev. 104, 107, 119-20 (1909).
Beginning in this country in 1899, juvenile courts spread throughout the United States,
as well as other countries, handling violations of law by children and other children's cases,
by noncriminal proceedings. The maximum jurisdictional age for most juvenile courts in
this country is 18. See Cosulich, Juvenile Court Laws of the United States (1939); Ketcham,
"The Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile Court," 7 Crime & Delin. 97, 99, 100 (1961);
Kohler, "The Courts for Handling Youth," 2 Nat'l Prob. & Parole Ass'n J. 123 (1956).
For recent reports by legislative commissions, in which the juvenile court was either a
primary or the sole concern: Report of Minnesota Legislative Interim Comm'n on Pub.
Welfare Laws (1959); Report of Governor's Special Study Comm'n on Juvenile Justice,
pt. I (California 1960) (hereinafter referred to as California Report); Report of N.Y.
Joint Legislative Comm. on Court Reorganization, pt. II, The Family Court Act (1962);
Report of Oregon Legislative Interim Comm. on Judicial Administration, pt. II, juvenile
Law (1959); Report of Comm. of Legislative Council of Wisconsin on Revision of Children's
Code (1955).
2 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 686, hereinafter termed N.Y.F.CA.
3 See Gellhorn, Children and Families in the Courts of New York City 3-20 (1954);
Alexander, "What is a Family Court, Anway?" 26 Conn. B.J. 243, 245-46 (1952); Foster,
"The Family in the Courts," 17 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 206 (1956); Standard Family Court Act
art. II (Nat'l Prob. & Parole Ass'n 1959).
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The crusade for family courts has resulted in over a dozen courts
scattered throughout the country approximating the pattern of jurisdic-
tion urged by family court proponents. 4 New York comes close to the
jurisdictional ideal in the number of different types of actions placed in
the Family Court.5 However, to those who regard a family court as
primarily an agency to prevent or deal with the dissolution of a marriage,6
the new New York court is deficient because it does not have jurisdiction
over divorces, separations, or annulments, nor can it force married couples
to try conciliation. With discouraging results from compulsory concilia-
tion elsewhere, the New York Legislative Committee merely recom-
mended, and the Legislature merely enacted, that the Family Court
should make "available an informal conciliation procedure to those whose
marriage is in trouble."7 The only compulsory feature of the New York
4 See Teeters & Reinemann, Challenge of Delinquency 376 (1950); Virtue, Family Cases
in Court 175, 192, 212 (1956); Young, Social Treatment in Probation and Delinquency 217
(1952); Chute, "Divorce and the Family Court," 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 49, 53-63
(1953); "Family Courts: A Symposium," 27 Tenn. L. Rev. 357, 362 (1960).
Both lay and legal groups urge the creation of family courts in their locality. Hickey,
"Docket of Human Understanding," Ladies' Home J. 21 (July 1958); Essex County, N.J.,
Bd. of Freeholders, Problems Presented in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court 19
(1958); Foster, supra note 3; Report of New Jersey Supreme Court's Comm. on Concilia-
tion and Reconciliation (Feb. 1963); Canadian Welfare Council, The Family Court in
Canada 15-17 (1954). The New York Family Court had been advocated vigorously since
at least 1954. See Community Service Soc'y of N.Y., New Patterns for Family Justice
(1954) ; Recommendations of N.Y. Judicial Conf. for Modernization of Court Structure
(1958); Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 3-16.
5 N.Y.F.C.A. provides for jurisdiction of the state-wide Family Court over parental
neglect (art. 3) ; support of dependents (art. 4) ; paternity proceedings (art. 5) ; termination
of parental custody because of permanent neglect (art. 6, pt. 1); adoption (art. 6, pt. 2)
(eff. Sept. 1, 1964); custody of a minor, on referral from the New York supreme court
(art. 6, pt. 3); juvenile delinquency and proceedings regarding children "in need of super-
vision" (art. 7); family offenses (art. 8); conciliation of spouses (art. 9). While the New
York supreme court continues to hold jurisdiction over matrimonial actions, it may refer
support and custody questions to the Family Court (art. 4, pt. 6; art. 6, pt. 3).
The Rhode Island Family Court Act of 1961, R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 8-10-1 to -45
(Supp. 1962), establishes a court of jurisdiction similar to New York's, with jurisdiction
over matrimonial actions in addition.
The New York and Rhode Island family courts are exceptional in the scope of their
jurisdiction, and also in the fact that they are state-wide instead of being established for
only one county or city.
6 See Alexander, "Family Court of the Future," Nat'l Prob. & Parole Ass'n Yb. 129, 144
(1951); Chute, supra note 4, at 31-32, 49-65; Sayre, "Divorce for the Unworthy: Specific
Grounds for Divorce," 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 26, 31-32 (1953). Reformers emphasize
conciliation, and some also would determine matrimonial actions on the basis of whether
the marriage is viable, rather than legal rights and specific grounds for dissolution.
7 N.Y.F.C.A. § 911. For reports on conciliation in California and New Jersey, see New
York Leg. Doc. No. 19, at 35-36 (Report of Joint Legislative Comm'n on Matrimonial and
Family Laws 1961); Fain, "The Lawyer's Role in California Reconciliation Court Plan,"
Proceedings: Family Law Section, Am. Bar Ass'n 211 (1962). For survey of various meth-
ods, see Gellhorn supra note 3, ch. 14; Virtue, supra note 4, at 177, 212, 217-18; Comment,
"The Work of the 1939 California Legislature," 13 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 41-43 (1939).
Compulsion to attempt conciliation has been attacked as unconstitutional, in part as a
denial of access to the courts to secure relief in a matrimonial action. People ex rel.
Christiansen v. Connell, 211 Ill. 2d 332, 118 N.E.2d 262 (1954); compare Truax v. Corri-
gan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
Some argue that even the filing of a complaint deepens antagonism, see "The Family
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procedure is that if a wife or husband chooses to file a conciliation peti-
tion, the court can direct his spouse to attend two conciliation con-
ferences.8
A family court's combination of jurisdiction cures the inefficiency and
the hardships to the litigants of fragmenting one complex of problems
among a number of courts.9 To take one example from the New York act,
in a proceeding based on disorderly conduct between family members, the
Family Court may direct the filing of a neglect, support or paternity
petition, and consolidate the proceedings. 10 Under traditional jurisdic-
tional arrangements in New York and elsewhere, the same family would
be the subject of a new proceeding in a different court with the need to
compile a new record, whenever a form of proceeding or remedy was
found inadequate.
A Family Court, ideally, is to focus on individual and family needs
rather than on traditional legal culpability. Thus, the New York act,
establishing the Family Court's jurisdiction over disorderly conduct
charges between family members, states that the purpose of such charges
generally "was not to secure a criminal conviction and punishment, but
practical help."' Disorderly conduct will therefore be handled in Family
Court by civil remedies, such as orders of protection prohibiting or
directing certain conduct between family members.12 To help diagnose
family relationships and needs, the Family Court's auxiliary services-its
staff of social workers and others trained in the behavioral sciences-are
to function in all the proceedings under its roof.13 A family court is
viewed as an extension of the juvenile court's "helping" approach to other
proceedings. The purpose is, as an early social crusader put it, to establish
a court for "consideration of all matters relating to the family . . . in
which the same methods of procedure shall prevail as in the juvenile
Part, A Report of Special Committee on the Family Part of Supreme Court," 12 Record of
N.Y.C.B.A. 89, 97 (1957), and should not be permitted prior to an attempt to conciliate. A
similar view on marital disharmony is reflected in the rule on exclusion of a spouse's adverse
testimony. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77-78 (1958); Wyatt v. United States,
362 U.S. 525, 526-27 (1959).
8 N.Y.F.C.A. § 924. Even this degree of compulsion was opposed by a committee of the
Bar Ass'n of New York City. See Report of Special Comm. on Reorganization of Courts
viii (1962).
The Rhode Island act provides that the Family Court may "suggest and hold" concilia-
tion conferences. R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 8-10-5 (Supp. 1962).
9 Unfortunately, the goal may not be fulfilled in practice, and the judge in one part of an
integrated court may not consider the records compiled in another. See Virtue, supra note
4, at 47, as to family cases in the California Superior Court in San Francisco.
1o N.Y.F.C.A. § 815.
11 Id. § 811.
12 Id. §§ 841, 842. The Family Court may refer any such proceeding to a criminal court
if it decides that its processes are inappropriate. Id. § 814. For failure to obey a Family
Court order, the Court may order a jail sentence for a maximum of six months. Id. § 846.
13 Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 9, 384.
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court and in which it will be possible to consider social evidence as
distinguished from legal evidence." 4
But cutting across the current for extension of the juvenile court ap-
proach to other family-centered cases, has been a rip-tide of criticism of
juvenile court procedure, 5 reflected in the legislative studies of the last
few years. This article will primarily consider how the New York
legislators dealt with the major problems since New York's changes are
among the most thoroughgoing, but it will also advert to the laws of
other states. One important procedural matter to be analyzed is the
disclosure or confidentiality of the "social evidence"-of the psycho-
logical, medical, and social information-that is the basis for evaluating
the individual's needs. This question cuts across all family court
proceedings, and will become increasingly significant the more the thera-
peutic approach is adopted. Here we shall suggest that there should be
valuable cross-pollination between juvenile and other proceedings in the
family court: a borrowing of the best of each.
Except for the use of social evidence in the various Family Court
actions, this article will only consider New York's new provisions with
respect to juvenile proceedings. Outside the juvenile field, the changes
effected by the New York Family Court Act are largely a consolidation
of jurisdiction. While it is significant that this consolidation was based on
the family as the matrix of actions, the details depend on the pre-existing
court system and other local conditions, and do not hold general interest.
WHO IS A JUVENILE DELINQUENT?
New York departed from typical juvenile court laws, by limiting the
definition of juvenile delinquency.
The traditional juvenile court theory is that the court is considering
the "whole child" and that the gravity of his violation of law is not of
much significance in determining his needs. The statutes typically define
a delinquent as a child who has violated any kind of law or ordinance.
Whether he has thrown newspaper on the street in disobedience of the
anti-littering ordinance or committed a serious robbery, he is a "de-
14 Judge Charles Hoffman, quoted in Young, supra note 4, at 217.
15 See Kahn, Court for Children 23 (1953); Antieau, "Constitutional Rights in Juvenile
Courts," 46 Cornell L.Q. 387 (1961); Ketcham, supra note 1; Long, "Headaches of a Judge
-A Challenge to the Bar," 27 Wash. L. Rev. 130 (.1952); McKay, "Juvenile Court as a
State Responsibility," Nat'l Prob. & Parole Ass'n Yb. 120 (1951); Paulsen, "Fairness to the
Juvenile Offender," 41 Minn. L. Rev. 547-48 (1957).
While many of the critics argue that there has been too wide a departure from the protec-
tions accorded in other judicial hearings, it is interesting that in Sweden determinations as
to children under fifteen, including orders of commitment, are made administratively.
Ryquist, "How Sweden Handles Its Juvenile and Youth Offenders," 20 Fed. Prob. 36
(1956) ; Sellin, "Sweden's Substitute for Juvenile Court," 261 Annals 146 (1949).
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linquent," and in all delinquency cases the judge has authority to use the
same measures, ranging from a word of advice to committing the child to
an institution for an indeterminate period. 6
The all-inclusive definition of delinquency has drawbacks, when
combined with the principle that the court cannot consider the child's
personality and tendencies until it first determines whether it has juris-
diction over him by virtue of his violation of law.'7  Children have
been held delinquent for minor violations. of law though they showed
no other symptom of delinquency. Appellate courts disapproved and
reversed, despite the terms of the statute.' 8 Calling such a child de-
linquent was out of keeping with the basic theory of appraising the whole
child, and was to judge him rigidly and intolerantly by adult criminal
standards. Moreover, appellate courts have ordered probation instead of
commitment when commitment seemed too harsh for a particular child,19
again despite the statute's broad grant of authority to the juvenile court
judge and despite the practice in criminal cases of acceptance of the
trial judge's evaluation of the individual's fitness for probation2 °
Faced with the question of whether the statute itself should limit the
judge's powers-particularly in view of the infrequent appeals and in-
16 See laws collected in Cosulich, supra note 1; Sussmann, Law of Juvenile Delinquency
(1950).
The Standard Juvenile Court Act § 8, 5 Nat'1 Prob. & Parole Ass'n 323, 344 (1959),
abandons the term "delinquent" because it is viewed as a stigma, and a minority of the
states follow this practice. E.g., Oregon (by a 1959 provision) and Virginia refer to children
who violate state, federal or local laws merely as children under the jurisdiction of the
court: Ore. Rev. Stat. § 419.476 (1961); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-158 (1950). See Brown,
"The Virginia Juvenile Court Law of 1950," 8 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 17 (1951). California
refers to this category of children as "ward of the court." Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns § 602
(1962).
17 The emphasis on a distinct initial determination of jurisdiction, was to counter the
possibility of the judge issuing an order merely on his impression that the child "should
have some correction." See People v. Pikunas, 260 N.Y. 72, 74, 182 N.E. 675, 676 (1932).
See also Matter of Green, 123 Ind. App. 81, 108 N.E.2d 647 (1952). The California Com-
mission observed that:
juvenile courts do not distinguish between the jurisdictional facts and the social data
at the hearing. Consequently, wardship is sometimes decided on issues that evolve
from a social investigation even though the jurisdictional facts have not been clearly
substantiated. . . .A two-stage hearing procedure is essential.
California Report, note 1, at 28. The New York act explicitly provides for a distinct ad-
judicatory phase before the dispositive phase. N.Y.F.C.A. § 746.
18 Matter of Sanders, 168 Neb. 458, 96 N.W.2d 218 (1959); Jones v. Common-
wealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946); State ex rel. Shaw v. Breon, 244 Iowa 49, 55
N.W.2d 565 (1952); cf. Matter of Barkus, 168 Neb. 257, 95 N.W.2d 674 (1959); Reyna v.
State, 206 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
19 Matter of La Flair, 286 App. Div. 943, 143 N.Y.S.2d 80 (3d Dep't 1955); Matter of
Anonymous, 281 App. Div. 1061, 121 N.Y.S.2d 281 (3d Dep't 1953); Matter of Angle, 275
App. Div. 884, 88 N.Y.S.2d 817 (3d Dep't 1949). See also McDaniel v. Shea, 278 F.2d 460,
462 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Cantu v. State, 207 S.W.2d 901 (Tex Civ. App. 1948); Sayre,
"Awarding Custody of Children," 9 U. Chi. L. Rev. 672, 691 (1942).
20 Hall, "Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal," 37 Colum. L. Rev. 521, 522, 762,
775-77 (1937) ; Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 416 (1961).
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frequent occasions for appellate correction of abuses2i--the New York
act first of all restricts the law violations warranting a delinquency charge
to violations amounting to a crime.22 The theory throughout the criminal
law in treating some acts as offenses and others as crimes (misdemeanors
or felonies) is that the former do not indicate an "evil nature," seriously
at war with society. 3 Assuming the Legislature has been wise in its
selection of acts for the "offense" category, there is not a great prob-
ability that children who commit offenses are potential criminals-no
greater probability than if the court took jurisdiction over children who
were, let us say, retarded three years in school.24 The logic of distinguish-
ing traffic offenses from serious violations of law, as several states do,
seems applicable to other offenses as well2 5 While the juvenile court's
delinquency jurisdiction was designed to remove children from the crim-
inal courts, inclusion of every child who could have been brought into the
latter may stretch the juvenile court's resources without commensurate
advantage.
21 The great paucity of appeals is attributable to parental acceptance of the juvenile
court's order-whether born of conviction or of indifference or despair-and lack of repre-
sentation by counsel. The California Commission remarked on the fact that "the meaning
of many statutes remains undefined" because of the dearth of appellate decisions. First
Interim Report of California Special Study Comm'n on Juvenile Justice 20 (1959).
22 N.Y.F.C.A. § 712(a).
New York is exceptional. Most of the laws, including recent revisions, continue to classify
commission of an offense as delinquency. E.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 260.015(5) (Supp. 1962);
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 419.476(1)(a) (1961); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.12 (1957); Conn. Gen. Stat.
Rev. 17-53 (Supp. 1961) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 211.031(1) (d) (1962) ; Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-158
(1950). See Conway, "The Juvenile Court System in Wisconsin," 34 Wis. B. Bull. 21, 25
(Feb. 1961).
However, in Iowa delinquency does not include violations below the grade of an indictable
misdemeanor unless habitual, Iowa Code Ann. § 232.30 (1949), and the law in Texas is
similar, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2238-1, § 3 (Supp. 1962). In New York such habitual
violation could subject the child to adjudication under the jurisdictional section dealing
with children beyond the control of lawful authority.
23 Thus, conviction for an offense cannot be used to impeach credibility because it does
not reflect on moral character. See Ando v. Woodberry, 8 N.Y.2d 165, 168, 168 N.E.2d 520,
522, 203 N.Y.S.2d 74, 76-77 (1960); People v. Brown, 2 App. Div. 2d 202, 203-04, 153
N.Y.S.2d 744, 746 (4th Dep't 1956); Merkling v. Ford Motor Co., 251 App. Div. 89, 96, 296
N.Y. Supp. 393 (4th Dep't 1937).
24 That a child committing minor violations may be seriously disturbed, as the California
Commission indicated (California Report, supra note 1, at 21), is not the crucial considera-
tion. The question is the probability the child is disturbed in a manner that will be mani-
fested by criminality, for the juvenile court is not designed to deal with every type of
disturbance. Only a small percentage of disturbed children become delinquent. Geis,
"Juvenile justice: Great Britain and California," 7 Crime & Delin. 111, 117 (1961).
25 California's new law provides for initial hearings on juvenile traffic violations before a
"traffic hearing officer." That officer may order disciplinary measures short of commitment,
but may, if such measures seem to him inadequate, refer the child for a hearing before the
juvenile court judge. Cal. 'Welfare & Inst'ns § 564 (1962). The Minnesota and Oregon laws
are somewhat similar. Minn. Stat. § 260.193 (Supp. 1962); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 419.535 (1961);
see also Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 38-802(e), 38-826(c) (Supp. 1961). Wisconsin, however
permits a delinquency adjudication on the basis of a traffic violation, without any special
procedure. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.36 (1957). For discussion of traffic offenses by juveniles,
see Weinstein & Robins, "The Juvenile Court in Missouri: 1957-1959-A Survey of
Current Developments and Future Requirements," 1959 Wash. U.L.Q. 373, 400.
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The New York act is not entirely clear on the related issue in
delinquency adjudication-is a child "delinquent" because of his violation
of law, without regard to any other circumstances? A possible and
desirable interpretation of the statute is that an adjudication of de-
linquency requires two steps: first, a finding that the child has committed
a violation of law amounting to a crime; and second, a determination
based on the child's background and behavior--on the whole child-that
he is likely, without state supervision, to continue to disobey societal
standards2 6 With this sort of formula, a delinquency adjudication differs
from a criminal conviction in its components, rather than merely in its
procedure or terminology. And a commentator on the new Minnesota
act, who was a member of the drafting commission, advises that it be
interpreted as here suggested for the New York act.2 7
California's experience illustrates the frustrations involved in mere
semantics. California avoided the stigma of the term delinquent by refer-
ring to all children under the court's jurisdiction as "ward[s] of the
court." But "ward of the court" came to have the same unfavorable con-
notation as "delinquent," which then afflicted even the children who were
"wards" only because of neglect by parents; a more specific term is now
used for the latter group2 8
CHILDEN WHO HAVE NOT VIOLATED THE LAW
The typical juvenile court act classes as delinquents, besides children
who have broken laws, those who are "ungovernable," truant, associate
with bad companions, have other specified habits, or, in a catchall phrase
used in many statutes, engage in conduct endangering their own welfare.2 9
One of the most controversial issues tackled in the New York and
26 See N.Y.F.C.A. § 731(c); but cf. §§ 712(a), 742, 743.
27 Pirsig, "Juvenile Delinquency and Crime: Achievements of the 1959 Minnesota Legis-
lature," 44 Minn. L. Rev. 363, 378 (1960).
Though a violation of law suffices for an adjudication under the California law, it re-
quires additional findings before the child can be taken from the physical custody
of his parent or guardian. Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns § 726 (1962). See Advisory Council of
Judges of Nat'l Council on Crime and Delirl., Procedure and Evidence in the Juvenile Court
72 (1962), recommending a requirement of such findings; see also McDaniel v. Shea, 278
F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Cantu v. State, 207 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Reyna
v. State, 206 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Sayre, supra note 19; compare Matter of
Christiansen, 119 Utah 361, 227 P.2d 760 (1951).
28 California Report, supra note 1, at 19. Compare Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns §§ 600, 601,
602 (1962), with former §§ 700, 735. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 211.031 (1962), which is similar
to California's former law.
29 See Cosulich, supra note 1; Sussmann, supra note 16; Teeters & Reinemann, supra
note 4, at 297. These provisions refer to continuous or repeated behavior rather than one
act. See State ex rel. Shaw v. Breon, 244 Iowa 49, 55 N.W.2d 565 (1952); People v. Pikunas,
260 N.Y. 72, 182 N.E. 675 (1932); Reyna v. State, 206 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947);
see Pirsig, supra note 27 as to new Minnesota act. Besides broadly described behavior, these
provisions usually include specific acts such as use of profane language.
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California revisions was how to handle this group. There are no compila-
tions showing the specific conduct adjudicated delinquent under these
broad provisions, but the usual case seems to be of a mother complaining
that a teen-ager stays out late, has unfit companions, talks back to her,
and, most frequently, that an unmarried daughter is having sexual rela-
tions.3
0
In England the juvenile courts do not have this broad "pre-
delinquency" jurisdiction and its abandonment here is sometimes sug-
gested." In this class of cases there is no need for judicial power, as in
the case of crimes, in order to protect the community from a child who
is harming others or to deter violations of law by other children. The
goal is only to help the child and prevent his further departure from
social norms (and incidentally to give surcease to the parents or other
embattled authorities). Arguing against this jurisdiction, is the lack of
knowledge of whether self-injuring "delinquent" behavior is an index of
adult criminality to the same extent as is a child's commission of a
crime.32 As a sociologist put it: "What he has done may often be the
most revealing evidence of what he is."' 33 From a juridical standpoint, the
"pre-delinquent" standard is vague and indefinite, leaving room for the
judge to enforce his personal values on sex, parent-child relations, and
the good life.34 Further, the child perceives commitment to an institution,
regardless of the treatment goal, as at least partly punitive; 3 5 so, there is
an aura of the same kind of injustice experienced from a vague penal
statute that does not give clear warning, or that imposes a sanction on a
"status" rather than specific acts.36 Finally, critics of "pre-delin-
quency" jurisdiction point out that the usual parent-complainant has
been inadequate or neglectful, hostile and punitive. The punitive attitude
to a child who is already emotionally deprived should not be intensified
30 Opinions are practically never written by the juvenile court and appellate decisions are
too few to use as estimates of the court workload; the above statement is based on personal
observation and discussions of the work of the courts.
31 See Abbott, The Child and the State 337 (1938); Diana, "Rights of Juvenile De-
linquents," 47 J. Crim. L., C & P.S. 561 (1951); Gels, supra note 24, at 111, 117; Rubin,
"Legal Definition of Offenses by Children and Youths," 1960 U. Ill. L.F. 512-15; Rubin,
"Legal Character of Juvenile Delinquency," 261 Annals 2-4 (1949).
32 As to delinquency as an index of adult criminality, see Young, Social Treatment in
Probation and Delinquency 14 (1952).
33 See Allen, "The Borderland of the Criminal Law: Problems of 'Socializing' Criminal
Justice," 32 Social Science Rev. 107, 117 (1958).
34 Compare Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 504 (1952), with Commercial Pictures
Corp. v. Regents, 346 U.S. 587 (1954), holding respectively that the terms "sacrilegious" and
"immoral" as applied to movie licensing, were excessively vague; United States v. Cardiff,
344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952) as to the unconstitutionality of statutory terms that are "vague
and fluid."
35 See Allen, supra note 33, at 116.
36 Compare People v. Munoz, 9 N.Y.2d 51, 172 N.E.2d 535, 211 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1961);
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
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by a delinquency proceeding; instead, it is argued, the problem should be
treated by social case-work, voluntarily accepted.
Having said all this, it goes against the paternalistic and human-
itarian grain to forego state authority over a fifteen-year old who
is promiscuous, wanders the streets until 3 a.m., spends her after-
noons at beer parties; and then to leave to her volition whether to accept
guidance or more restraining custody than her parents afford. And the
situation of a desperate parent who feels responsible but impotent to
exercise control, is unparallelled outside the parent-child world.
NEW YORK's SOLUTION
There was heated criticism of the initial proposal of the New York
revisors to scrap the commitment power in "pre-delinquent" cases.3Y
Their final recommendation, and the present legislation, provides for the
same powers over children who are "ungovernable or habitually diso-
bedient" as over children who have broken the criminal laws, except
that it may not be possible to commit the former to state training schools.38
These schools are viewed by some as more punitive, or a more drastic
restraint and interference with the child's freedom, than other state
facilities or "homes" maintained by philanthropic organizations. 9 Cali-
fornia and Kansas make somewhat similar distinctions for this type of
case.40
Whether the distinction is valid involves practical, operational issues
37 See Report of New York joint Legislative Comm. on Court Reorganization, pt. II,
at 125-26.
38 N.Y.F.C.A. §§ 756 and 758 would appear to make a distinction in the commitment
power as to these two categories of children. However, in Doe v. Doe, 36 Misc. 2d 611, 234
N.Y.S.2d 688 (Fain. Ct. N.Y.C. 1962), a Family Court judge interpreted the act as per-
mitting commitment to a training school (while noting that the Department of Social
Welfare did not agree with this interpretation), and the decision has not been appealed.
In April, 1963, the New York Legislature enacted an amendment (not yet approved
by the Governor) temporarily authorizing commitment of children in the "ungovernable"
category to state training schools. The authorization expires July 1, 1964 so the issue
will again be debated.
39 Thus, under New York law no child under twelve could be committed to a training
school unless he had committed an act amounting to a felony, N.Y. Soc. Welfare § 430(3),
and a child who did not adjust in other institutions could be transferred to a training
school, but only after an additional hearing. Matter of Smith, 92 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Child. Ct.
Erie County 1949). See Missouri provision, infra note 59.
However, a prominent social worker urges that the training schools are not and should
not be viewed as less rehabilitative than other agencies, and also that the treatment needs
of children do not depend on whether they have or have not violated the law. Address by
Dr. Alfred Kahn at First Ann. Conf. of N.Y. State Training Schools (Sept. 1962).
A side note is the decision holding racial segregation invalid in a state training
school, even if permissible in a prison, on the ground that the school bears "no resemblance"
to the latter. Myers v. State Bd. of Pub. Welfare, 224 Md. 246, 167 A.2d 765 (1961).
40 Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns §§ 730, 731, 777 (1962); California Report, supra note 1, at
21; Kan. Gen. Stat. §§ 38-802(d), 38-826(b) (Supp. 1961).
The typical acts, however, including recent revisions, do not make any distinction. See,
e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 260.158 (1959); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-178 (1950); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 48.34 (1957).
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of whether there are other adequate facilities; whether the training
schools offer appropriate types of treatment; whether there is any percep-
tion by the child of a difference in the two types of commitments; and
whether the "ungovernable" child living together with those who "act out"
their disturbance in crimes adversely influences the values and conduct
of the former.
From the standpoint of statutory improvement, there perhaps should
be a device in the nature of a custody proceeding-blaming neither the
child as "ungovernable" or "delinquent" nor the parent, who may be
exerting all his abilities, as "neglectful"--to determine whether the child
needs custody other than parental.41 And the determination should be
based largely on such criteria as whether he is functioning normally in
the community by regular attendance at school or employment. It is the
broad discretion in both phases of the proceeding-both in adjudicating
whether the child is within the court's jurisdiction as well as in his
disposition-which gives the judge an extraordinary and troubling degree
of power over children who are before the court though they have not
broken any law.
COUNSEL IN JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS
New York and Oregon are the first states in the union to provide for
the assignment of attorneys in every juvenile case if the child requests
counsel and cannot secure his own. 42 On a less inclusive basis a number
of other states are also supplying attorneys in juvenile court. Compared
with the situation a decade ago, when lawyers were almost unknown in
juvenile cases 4 3-an appearance in one out of two hundred cases was a
maximum estimate even for a metropolitan court-the new look is a
remarkable contrast.
The change was produced by pressures both from above and below.
From above, there were appellate rulings that a parent or child had a
right under due process to appear with retained counsel; 44 representa-
41 Cf. the suggestion that in acute cases the "ungovernable" child be handled through a
neglect proceeding against the parent and that the Standard juvenile Court Act be so in-
terpreted. Rubin, "Legal Definition of Offenses by Children and Youths," supra note 31,
at 514-15.
42 N.Y.F.C.A. §§ 249, 343, 741; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 419.498(2) (1961).
43 See McKesson, "Right to Counsel in Juvenile Proceedings," 45 Minn. L. Rev. 843, 845
(1961); Ketcham, supra note 1, at 104-05; First Interim Report California Spedal Study
Comm'n on Juvenile Justice 20 (1959).
44 See People v. Fifield, 136 Cal. App. 2d 741, 289 P.2d 303 (1st Dist. 1955);
Matter of Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (D.C. Munic. Ct. 1953); Matter of Barkus, 168 Neb. 257,
95 N.W.2d 674 (1959); Matter of Poulin, 100 N.H. 458, 129 A.2d 672 (1957); Matter of
Frinzl, 152 Ohio St. 164, 87 N.E.2d 583, 588 (1949); Matter of Brown, 201 S.W.2d 844, 856
(Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Notes, 44 Geo. LJ. 138 (1955); 54 Mich. L. Rev. 1000 (1956).
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tion became generally permitted-albeit some courts discouraged it.45
But the question of practical importance was whether attorneys would
be assigned. Because of the low economic level of many of the children
appearing in juvenile court--combined perhaps with the parents' feeling
of hopelessness or resentment towards the child or of the futility of a
lawyer-attorneys were scarcely ever retained.
The United States Supreme Court has been steadily emphasizing
equality of rights for indigent defendants in criminal cases and their
need for assigned counsel.4 This trend was reflected in a few appellate
decisions to the effect that due process requires the assignment of counsel
to indigents in delinquency cases when the hearing might be unfair and
the child might be prejudiced without counsel.47 One can venture the
guess that these rulings would be upheld by the Supreme Court, even
though it has to date only applied in criminal cases the principle that
due process requires assignment of counsel to prevent unfairness, and
even though juvenile delinquency cases have uniformly been regarded
as civil for constitutional purposes.48
If only for the sake of symmetry in the law, to borrow Cardozo's
phrase, the bar became increasingly concerned with the lack of pro-
cedural protections in juvenile court in comparison to criminal or even
civil cases; and this concern crystallized around the need for representa-
tion. New York's new provision for the assignment of counsel emerged
in large part from an experimental assignment project conducted with
foundation funds by the New York City Legal Aid Society under the
leadership of the city bar association.49
45 See Matter of Brown, supra note 44; Ketcham, supra note 1.
46 E.g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S.
443 (1962); Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 U.S. 525 (1961); McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109
(1961). Gideon v. Cochran, 370 U.S. 908, 932 (1962), has been reargued for the purpose
of considering whether due process imposes a greater requirement than that stated in Betts
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Betts required assignment to indigent criminal defendants
where "special circumstances" show need for counsel. [Betts v. Brady, supra, was over-
ruled in Gideon v. Wainwright, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963).]
47 McDaniel v. Shea, 278 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Shioutakon v. District of Columbia,
236 F.2d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1956); People v. Dotsen, 46 Cal. 2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956);
compare Lazaros v. State, 228 S.W.2d 972 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); State v. Superior Ct., 106
Wash. 619, 180 Pac. 875 (1919).
48 Refusal to assign counsel in a deportation proceeding (which has been held to have
consequences as grave as criminal conviction, Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232
(1951)), has not been held a violation of due process. See Madokoro v. Del Guercio, 160
F.2d 164 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947). Counsel can, however, be retained.
Hyun v. Landon, 219 F.2d 404, 406 (9th Cir. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 990 (1956).
Objections to juvenile proceedings for lack of the attributes of a criminal trial have
uniformly been answered by the assertion that the proceedings are civil. E.g., Cinque v.
Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 AUt. 678 (1923); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353
(1932); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 AUt. 198 (1905).
49 See Schinitsky, "Role of Lawyer in Children's Court," 17 Record of N.Y.C.BA. 10
(1962). There had also been emphasis by laymen on the need for legal protection. See
Community Service Soc'y of N.Y., justice for Youth 11 (1955); Gellhorn, quoting U.S.
Children's Bureau official, supra note 3, at 78. Cf. Tappan, juvenile Delinquency 170 (1949).
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PRos AND CONS ON NEED FOR ATTORNEYS
With few appellate rulings on the problem, evaluating a provision for
assignment necessarily focuses on policy considerations and the value
of counsel in juvenile court.
An early view was that the judge himself protects the child's in-
terests in lieu of an attorney. This argument has been submerged in
recognition that juvenile court judges are not a breed apart and that
"As must generally be the case, the trial judge could not effectively dis-
charge the roles both of judge and defense counsel.""
But is there a function and need for a "defense counsel"-an advocate
-for the child as there would be for a defendant in other proceedings?
The argument against representation, that most children admit their
delinquency, is not persuasive that they have no need for an attorney
to prepare and present evidence on their behalf. Precise development of
the evidence is valuable despite the inclusive definition of delinquency
and the unitary dispositive power for all types of violations. An un-
counseled child's admission that he was, let us say, in a gang fight
may not mean that he participated in a manner constituting any violation
of law."
An attorney's precise development of the evidence will also bear on
disposition and the grave decision between commitment and probation,
because the judge's estimate of the child's tendencies and needs is and
should be influenced by how the child acted in the incident bringing him
to court. And the child's attorney can help him in the disposition phase
itself, by adducing or questioning background facts and suggesting treat-
ment possibilities. As the Supreme Court has declared in criminal cases,
defendant's attorney has an important role in the sentencing phase, though
sentence is discretionary.52 Of course, an attorney also ensures that the
child in fact receives the protections the law grants him, such as the
right to adequate notice of the allegations against him or the exclusion
of incompetent evidence.53
50 Carnley v. Cochran, supra note 46, at 510. Compare Eskridge v. Washington Prison
Bd., 357 U.S. 214, 216 (1958).
51 There is no logic in relying on law violations for delinquency jurisdiction unless all
the elements of a breach of the law are established. The criminal law has established only
that the sum of these elements show antisociality. As to proof of the element of intent,
compare Ballard v. State, 192 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), with Borders v. United
States, 256 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1958).
52 Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954) ; Keenan v. Burke, 342 U.S. 881 (1951) ; Town-
send v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 178-79 (1946).
53 Matter of Barkus, 168 Neb. 257, 95 N.W.2d 674 (1959) and Matter of Contreras, 109
Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1952), where the courts noted that an attorney
would have protected the child against the admission of unreliable evidence. See Shioutakon
v. United States, 236 F.2d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1956), and Williams v. State, 219 S.W.2d 509
(Tex. Civ. App. 1949), as to the advice of counsel on optional jury trial and self-incrimina-
tion, respectively.
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It has been suggested that the attorney's exclusive loyalty to the de-
fendant in a criminal case and to his client's desire to avoid conviction
and sentence, is inappropriate in juvenile court and that a lawyer will
therefore have a coAfused role in representing a juvenile.4 The effort and
hope to rehabilitate a youthful delinquent through state-imposed discipline
is greater than in the case of an adult. Thus we assume a benefit to the
child-which is not assumed in the case of an adult charged with crime
-from an adverse adjudication and state supervision or detention when
the facts of his case warrant it. In concrete terms, this view of the ulti-
mate interest of the child may dictate that his attorney disclose evidence
adverse to him.
But such an obligation would not be foreign to the law; it is like that
imposed on the prosecutor in a criminal case to see "that justice shall
be done." 55 While the courts have not had occasion to discuss it, an
obligation of disclosure could well be viewed as appropriate for the de-
fending attorney as an officer of the court in any case involving more
than merely private interest, whether criminal or juvenile. And a special
factor in the juvenile court is that there is no prosecutor to combat the
attorney for the child.50 Indeed, there is a possible boomerang from
assigning attorneys in this court: the judge may be thrown into a
prosecutor's state of mind by the presence of an advocate for the child
but none against him. The attorney's assumption of the obligation of
disclosure may help avert this danger.
ASSIGNMENT IN SELECTED CASES
Instead of providing, like New York, for the assignment of counsel in
all indigent juvenile cases, several states now mandate assignment when-
ever the alleged violation of law amounts to a felony. And several grant
the court discretion to assign in any juvenile case. 5T
If assignment in juvenile cases-is to be selective, the felony distinc-
54 See Procedure and Evidence, supra note 27, at 42-43.
55 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 85 (1935). See also Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S.
264, 269-70 (1959); United States ex rel. Kling v. La Vallee, 306 F.2d 199, 201 (2d Cir.
1962); People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 136 N.E.2d 853, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1956); People
v. Fielding, 158 N.Y. 542, 547, 53 N.E. 497, 498 (1899).
56 See McKesson, supra note 43, as to the possibility of an appearance by the district
attorney to balance the juvenile's representation. See Matter of Fleishman, 13 App. Div. 2d
818 (1st Dep't 1961) ; new trial ordered to permit representation of child in view of conflict
in evidence; the court directed that the city corporation counsel appear also, though he did
not customarily appear in juvenile cases.
57 Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns §§ 634, 700 (1962), directs appointment of counsel in any case
of an act amounting to a felony, and leaves appointment to the discretion of the judge in
other cases. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.25(6) (1957), and Minn. Stat. Ann. § 260.155(2) (1959),
provide for discretionary appointment of counsel in any case. Cf. Virginia's provision for
guardian ad litem, who may be an attorney, in the absence of the parent. Va. Code Ann.
§ 16.1-173 (1950). See Reiderer, "Responsibility of the Bar," Summary of Procs, Am. Bar
Ass'n Sec. on Family Law 76, 77-79 (1961).
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tion has some merit. An adjudication against the child on such serious
grounds carries moral and social opprobrium; is more likely to result in
his commitment than if the charge were a minor one; and will con-
stitute a more damaging record against him.5" Such grave consequences
require the assurance of accuracy furnished by counsel. Furthermore,
in many states, including New York, the statutes do not provide for
assignment of counsel, in criminal cases below the level of a felony. As
against the felony distinction, all juvenile cases are heard in the same
court and subject to the same powers of disposition; a commitment with-
out an assignment of counsel merely because the charge was below the
grade of a felony, would be likely to impress the child and his parents
as an unjust discrimination. 59
With the differences between the programs of the several states that
are now making assignments, and with the majority of juvenile courts
throughout the country still wholly barren of attorneys, a virtual "con-
trolled" experiment is in process from which the operating effect of
counsel in juvenile court can be appraised.
PROCEDURAL CHANGES
Typical juvenile court acts, including New York's old act, contain
few directions on procedure compared with the codes governing criminal
and regular civil actions. The new New York act tightens the procedural
framework. New York now has detailed rules governing arrests and
detention of children prior to the court hearing, and also prescribes time-
limits and periodic reconsideration of commitment and probation orders,
instead of indeterminate orders. 0 (To prevent over-long detention, due
58 A juvenile adjudication cannot be treated as a criminal conviction to impeach the
defendant's credibility in a subsequent criminal trial. See People v. Peele, 12 N.Y.2d 890,
237 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1963); Kiracofe v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 833, 97 S.E.2d 14 (1957);
Woodiey v. State, 227 Ind. 407, 86 N.E.2d 529 (1949); State v. Coffman, 360 Mo. 782,
230 S.W.2d 761 (1950); Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Mason
v. Klaserner, 180 N.E.2d 870 (Ohio 1961); Murphy v. City of N.Y., 273 App. Div. 492,
78 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1st Dep't 1948). Compare State v. Homolka, 158 Kan. 22, 145 P.2d 156
(1944). However, many statutes provide that the adjudication can be considered in
determining his sentence.
The gravity of the charge was a factor in determining whether due process required assign-
ment of counsel to an indigent criminal defendant. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-71
(1932); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663
(1947).
59 Missouri provides that before commitment to a state training school the juvenile shall
have an opportunity to be represented by counsel at a hearing for that purpose. Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 211.211 (1959). See Weinstein & Robins, supra note 25, at 389.
60 N.Y.F.C.A. §§ 756(b), (c), 757(b), 758(c). Compare Minn. Stat. Ann. § 260.185(4)
(1962), providing for indeterminate orders with annual judicial review, and also for orders
with a duration specified by the court. See Diana, supra note 31, favoring temporal limits on
orders of disposition.
Typically, however, a juvenile order is indeterminate for the child's minority, nor is there
customarily any periodic judicial appraisal of need for its continuance. E.g., Arizona Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 8-236B (1956); Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns §§ 730, 731 (1962). Cf. Note, 50 Harv.
L. Rev. 677 (1937), as to periodic review of indeterminate criminal sentences.
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to mistake or mere bureaucratic oversight, periodic review has also
been proposed in New York and elsewhere for mental illness commit-
ments-another type of indefinite, therapeutic, civil commitment.)61
Besides requiring notice of the hearing and other attributes of regu-
larity, New York, similar to California, now incorporates from the
criminal law the rule that a child cannot be adjudicated delinquent solely
on the basis of an extra-judicial admission: that is, on testimony-
in practice usually by a policeman-that the child admitted the de-
linquency though he now denies it or is silent."
One decided innovation in the New York act is the provision that the
child shall be informed at the commencement of a hearing of his right
to remain silent. While the appellate courts hold that the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination does not apply in juvenile court be-
cause the proceedings are civil, 63 commentators have urged that pro-
ceedings intended to give the child special protection should not deny
him a protection accorded adults." Of less semantic but more realistic
significance, children as well as adults can benefit from the values of the
privilege in terms of preserving the individual's self-respect and in-
tegrity.65 The major argument on the other side is that telling the child
1 N.Y.C.B.A., Mental fllness and Due Process 27-28 (Recommendations by Special
Comm. to Study Commitment Procedures in cooperation with Cornell Law School (1962)
recommends that all commitment orders be limited, with extension possible on application
by the hospital. However, in American Bar Foundation, The Mentally Disabled and the
Law 130, 404, 414 (1961), it is only recommended that a periodic review be undertaken by
hospital authorities. The contrast raised the question of the necessity for court supervision
of review by the administrating authorities.
62 N.Y.F.C.A. § 744(6). Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns § 701 (1962), provides, with some am-
biguity with respect to whether the admission is sufficient basis for adjudication: "When ...
the minor has made an extrajudicial admission ... and denies the same at the hearing, the
court may continue the hearing . . . to enable the probation officer to subpoena witnesses
*.. to prove the allegations of the petition." See Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 91-92
(1954); Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1055, 2071, 2075 (3d ed. 1942), as to the rule in criminal
cases. While corroboration is there required, the admission is admissible under the exception
to the hearsay rule for admissions against interest. Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 240
(1957).
63 See People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932); State v. Shardell, 153 N.E.2d
510 (Dist. Ct. Ohio 1958); Matter of Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 973 (1955); Matter of Mont, 175 Pa. Super. 150, 102 A.2d 460 (1954); Matter of
Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 208, 183 P.2d 282 (1947); cf. Ex parte Tahbel, 46 Cal. App. 755,
189 Pac. 804 (2d Dist. 1920); Williams v. State, 219 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949);
Ballard v. State, 192 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946)-the latter two cases to be read
with Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944).
64 See, e.g., Note, "Due Process in the juvenile Courts," 2 Catholic U.L. Rev. 90 (1952).
See also, in support of according the privilege, Lou, juvenile Courts in the United States 130
(1927); U.S. Children's Bureau, Specialized Courts Dealing With Children 54 (1954). In
practice, the privilege was accorded in some courts though not constitutionally necessary.
Note, "The California juvenile Court," 10 Stan. L. Rev. 471, 497-98 (1958).
65 The dignity of the individual seems demeaned when he is compelled to publicly con-
fess misconduct, and to choose between self-protection and the commission of perjury. See
Ex parte Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 331 (1866), quoting Alexander Hamilton:
forcing answers to incriminating questions is "'to hold out a bribe to perjury.'" See also
Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31, 438-39 (1956).
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he need not talk discourages the rapport between child and court officials
which is a main objective in juvenile proceedings. In practice the child
may well testify though not compelled; communication by the child in
an atmosphere of free choice is the best of both worlds.
Statutory creation of the privilege of silence should be correlated with
establishment of a program for assignment of attorneys.66 The juvenile
court judge, sitting without a jury, may draw an adverse inference from
the child's silence, and the question of whether the privilege should be
adopted or waived is a subtle one on which the child needs the advice of
counsel.
USE OF "SOCIAL EVIDENCE"
How to use "social evidence"-information on the individual's per-
sonality, capacities, relationships, and environment-is a crucial issue
for all family court proceedings.
Under the new New York Family Court Act, juvenile cases as well
as some other types will use social data in a preliminary "intake" phase,
which has long been a feature of juvenile courts.6" In intake a court officer
determines whether a formal proceeding should be initiated or whether
an attempt at adjustment through social case-work methods should first
be assayed, without a court hearing and adjudication.6" For juvenile
proceedings, a great issue has been whether a complaining policeman or
a victim of a child's violation of law must be permitted the opportunity
he would have in a lower criminal court to initiate a proceeding against
the child,69 or whether the intake officer and the judge can exercise over-
66 See Shioutakon v. United States, 236 F.2d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1956), as to the need
for counsel to advise on optional statutory privileges.
67 See N.Y.F.C.A. §§ 734 (delinquency and supervision cases), 333 (neglect), 424 (sup-
port), 823 (family offenses); Kahn, Court for Children 61 (1953); Teeters & Reinemann,
Challenge of Delinquency 319, 327 (1950).
68 There is one school of thought that such casework should not be undertaken by the
court and that the individuals should be referred to a voluntary social agency unless a
proceeding is begun. See Young, Social Treatment in Probation and Delinquency 243-47
(1952); cf. Fields, "Guideposts for Juvenile Court," 22 Fed. Prob. 12 (1958); Tappan,
"Unofficial Delinquency," 29 Neb. L. Rev. 547 (1950). However, the predominant view is
that "unofficial" casework is desirable-subject, according to some authorities, to the con-
ditions that it be limited to a short period and that it appears jurisdiction over the child
could be established in the event of a judicial hearing. See Rubin, "Legal Character of
Juvenile Delinquency," supra note 31, at -. N.YF.C.A. § 734(a) (ii) (c); Cal. Welfare &
Inst'ns § 721 (1962); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 208.070 (1962); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.19 (1957).
The objection that the child is coerced to accept the "unofficial" casework by fear of a
court proceeding if he refuses, seems an insubstantial interference with his liberty, compared,
for example, to the coercion in a criminal case to plead guilty to a lesser offense to avoid
trial for a greater.
69 E.g., N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 150 (2): a warrant or summons must issue if the
judge is "satisfied . . . that there is reasonable ground to believe" defendant has committed
the crime.
However, since it is justifiable to create a juvenile court and abolish criminal respon-
sibility for a child's violation of law, by the same token seemingly, a juvenile proceeding
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riding discretion. New York's new act, while providing for adjustment
efforts in intake, permits an insistent complainant in juvenile and other
Family Court proceedings to begin a formal action.7" Some of the
juvenile court acts have dispensed with this assurance of access to
judicial process. 71
It is at the other end of the proceeding, in determining the proper
order of disposition, that social data reaches greatest importance.
7 2
Indeed the use of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and background
reports in disposition is the essence of the juvenile court therapy which
a family court purports to extend to other proceedings. The issue here
is whether these reports should be disclosed to the child and his parents
so that they will have an opportunity to refute inaccuracies or present
countervailing considerations.
7 3
The New York draftsmen came almost full circle on this issue. Their
initial proposal was that the reports be furnished to the parties as well
as to the court, except that the court might withhold medical data and
psychiatric diagnoses.74 This proposal was strongly opposed on the two
grounds that child and parents might suffer psychologically from knowl-
edge of the reports, and that the practice of disclosing them would deter
relatives, teachers, neighbors, and other members of the community
from giving information to probation workers. The result was the
present provision that the reports are confidential to the court, with
judicial discretion to disclose them in whole or part.75 Elsewhere, several
states by statute require that the entire report be open to the inspection
against the child can also be banned when the public interest so requires. Cf. note 7 supra,
as to denial of remedies in connection with a civil cause of action.
70 N.Y.F.C.A. §§ 734(b), 333(b), 424(b), 823(b). The new Rhode Island Family Court
Act mandates an intake service for "juvenile" cases, but otherwise merely provides that
intake will assume whatever duties are assigned by the court. R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 8-10-22
(1956).
71 Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns § 721 (1962), provides that no petition "shall be filed without
the approval of the probation officer except by order of the juvenile court." See also Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-222 (1956); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.19 (1957); cf. Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-164
(1950).
72 An adjudication of delinquency-a determination of whether it was committed and
the court therefore has jurisdiction--cannot be based on a background report. Krell v.
Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954); Diana, supra note 31, at 565; Waite, "How
Far Can Court Procedure Be Socialized Without Impairing Individual Rights?" 12 J.
Crim. L., C & P.S. 339 (1922). However, in practice judges frequently see the report during
the adjudicatory phase of the proceedings. See Note, "Correct Use of Background Reports
in Juvenile Delinquency Cases," 5 Syracuse L. Rev. 67 (1953); Young, supra note 69, at 212.
73 See Paulsen, "Fairness to the Juvenile Offender," 41 Minn. L. Rev. 547, 567 (1957),
on importance of these considerations. As to the basic principle that fairness and accuracy
requires opportunity for refutation: Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-99 (1958). The
problem arises in a variety of situations. See disapproval of use of undisclosed reports in
denial of admission to bar: Matter of Burke, 87 Ariz. 336, 351 P.2d 169 (1960).
74 Report of New York Joint Legislative Comm. on Court Reorganization, pt. II at 123
(1962).
75 N.Y.F.C.A. § 746(b).
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of the parties or included in the record.76 Absent a statute, the few
appellate courts that have considered the question have held that dis-
closure of reports is not required in juvenile cases and this view has been
generally adopted in practice.
7 7
FOR OR AGAINST DISCLOSURE?
How should the pros and cons of disclosure be resolved? For a judge
to make the grave decision to commit a child to an institution, without
allowing the child or his parents any opportunity to correct misinforma-
tion or offset the data in the reports, seems dictatorial and unfair. The
argument that disclosure will have the effect of drying up sources of
information is not too compelling: the probation worker's informants are
not undercover agents who must continue to function in secret, as the
argument runs in narcotic prosecutions and the like.78 Further, the prac-
tice could be borrowed from internal security cases of a discretionary
deletion of names and the informant thus assured of anonymity; the
problem here is not confidentiality in the sense of some of the testimonial
privileges, where the information itself is intended to be confidential.
Of more moment than the problem of sources: the child or his parents
may well suffer serious psychological damage from confronting a report
that categorizes their inadequacies and depicts their images as others
see them. Is it therapeutic to declare to a parent that his neighbors ob-
serve him drinking or that he has been judged of low intelligence or that
76 Cal. Welfare & Instns § 827 (1962); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 208.140 (1962). See Matter of
Dattilo, 136 Conn. 488, 72 A.2d 50 (1950), with respect to rule of court providing for
inclusion of report in record and cross-examination of its author. The new Rhode Island
Family Court Act provides that in all its proceedings, which include juvenile proceedings,
the parties can examine the background report, cross-examine its author, and introduce
evidence to controvert it. R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 8-10-9 (Supp. 1962). Reports of medical,
psychiatric, or psychological examinations apparently are not covered by this provision.
Id., § 8-10-8.
On the other hand, Oregon expressly states "reports and other material relating to the
child's history and prognosis" shall not be part of the record, and Virginia provides that
all statements to court employees are privileged unless the judge orders their disclosure
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 419.567(2) (1961); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-209 (1960).
Most statutes, including the recent Wisconsin and Minnesota revisions, have no provision
on whether the reports should be disclosed.
17 Matter of Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973
(1955); cf. Matter of Caronna, 197 La. 494, 2 So. 2d 1 (1941). Compare Ex parte Rixen,
74 N.D. 80, 19 N.W.2d 863 (1945), disapproving revocation of order of probation and con-
sequent commitment, on the basis of information not of record. And see Matter of Toorans,
154 N.Y.S.2d 160 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1955), applying statute which requires hearing
for revocation of probation, though there was no statutory requirement for a hearing when
the judge made the original choice between probation and commitment.
In McMullan, "Lawyer's Role in juvenile Court," 8 Prac. Law. Apr. 1962, p. 49, 52, the
author says that in his court he permits a child's attorney "to know all the evidence and
facts upon which the judge acts," on the understanding that the attorney will regard it as
confidential. As in other juvenile courts, however, the child is not usually represented by
an attorney.
78 See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59-60 (1957).
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his claimed affection for his child covers rejecting behavior, or to spell
out that a child is illegitimate or shunned in the neighborhood as a
troublemaker or disapproved by his teacher as the least responsible
child in the class? The objective of the juvenile court is to help parents
and child to a better adjustment. Might not such unsought and wound-
ing revelations affect the individual's self-confidence and his relationships
and block therapy not only immediately but indefinitely?
Social workers with a high sense of professional ethics say they would
tailor a report to prevent psychological damage from its disclosure. The
result of a disclosure practice may well be reporting on a vague and
superficial level.79 The judge does not need a report in the depth and
detail required for psychiatric or social casework. Still, disclosure of
background reports will accomplish nothing if they become so general
that the judge must either reject them entirely or in effect accept the
probation worker's ipse dixit. Thus, there must be a measure of flexibility
in a disclosure requirement so that psychological damage can be avoided.
The present New York provigion, however, emphasizing confidentiality
and leaving disclosure entirely to the judge's discretion, seems too lax.
The New York Family Court Act adopts this confidentiality provision
for all the proceedings in which reports are used, ° except that in child
custody cases it leaves the problem to the common law. I suggest that
the case-by-case development already had in the child custody field can
be instructive in formulating a flexible but protective rule on disclosure
for juvenile and other Family Court proceedings.
USE OF REPORTS IN CUSTODY CASES
In determining which parent should get the child following a matri-
monial dissolution or separation, social-minded judges have, with the
rise of the behavioral sciences, recognized that they need not only the
wisdom of Solomon, but background information and expert diagnosis.8 '
In New York City with its great number of custody cases, court reform
groups urged without success for a number of years that the court grant-
ing custody establish a social investigation service. Finally, after a
"Family Counseling Unit" had been launched with foundation funds
79 See Ass'n of Bar of N.Y.C., Reports on Proposals of Joint Legislative Comm. 41-42;
Family Serv. Ass'n of Am., The Lawyer and the Social-Worker 17-18 (1959), as to social
worker's apprehension of compulsion to reveal confidential statements.
80 N.Y.F.C.A. §§ 347(b), 435(b), 625(b), 746(b).
81 See Herb v. Herb, 8 App. Div. 2d 419, 188 N.Y.S.2d 41 (4th Dep't 1959), where there
had been a stipulation for a custody investigation by a private social agency; Gluckstern
v. Gluckstern, 2 App. Div. 2d 744, 153 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1st Dep't 1956), where case was
remanded for custody investigation by social-worker (after investigation, same custody order
was made as prior thereto: 17 Misc. 2d 83, 158 N.Y.S.2d 504, aff'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 999,
165 N.Y.S.2d 432; 4 N.Y.2d 521, 151 N.E.2d 897, 176 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1958)).
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under the aegis of the city bar association, this Unit became an agency
of the courts-another example of a pilot project for court service ini-
tiated under private auspices and growing into a public program. 2
The approach in child custody to disclosure of reports has been quite
different from that in delinquency. In child custody the controlling legal
consideration is that the reports are used in an adjudication of the com-
peting rights of the parents, rather than in an exercise of judicial discre-
tion, and that due process therefore requires a basis in evidence. Thus,
in child custody cases the psychological disadvantages of disclosure have
been subordinated to the legal need to give the affected party an op-
portunity to know and contest adverse evidence. 3 And there has been
much greater litigation and consideration of the whole issue of disclosure
in child custody than in juvenile court cases. Due to the higher income
level of custody litigants, the parties are represented by attorneys, and
are more assertive and more expectant of recognition by the court of
their demands and interests.
Let us briefly consider the conceptual difference between custody and
delinquency cases. The pre-disposition reports in a juvenile case have
been considered analogous to pre-sentence reports in a criminal case,
and it is said that due process permits the judge to treat the latter as
confidential advice to inform his discretion . 4 However, even in a criminal
case there is a good argument, despite the much-cited Williams decision,
that discretion must be exercised on valid premises and that a defendant
therefore has a right to some opportunity to contest the accuracy of the
reports about him. 5 In any event, social data has a higher valence, war-
82 "The Family Part, A Report of Special Committee on Family Part of Supreme
Court," 12 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 89 (1957). Use of the unit lies in the court's discretion. In
some other courts a social investigation is mandatory; e.g., under an Ohio law enacted in
1951 a social investigation is required in divorce cases when there are children under 14.
Chute, "Divorce and the Family Court," 18 Law and Contemp. Prob. 49, 53-62 (1953).
83 See, e.g., Fewell v. Fewell, 23 Cal. 2d 431, 144 P.2d 592 (1943); Williams v. Williams,
8 Ill. App. 2d 1, 130 N.E.2d 291, 294-95 (1955); Tumbleson v. Tumbleson, 117 Ind. App.
455, 73 N.E.2d 59 (1947); Test v. Test, 131 N.J. Eq. 197, 24 A.2d 226 (Ch. 1942); Matter of
Gupton, 238 N.C. 303, 77 S.E.2d 716 (1953); Crawford v. Crawford, 256 S.W.2d 875 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1952) ; Wunsch v. Wunsch, 248 Wis. 29, 20 N.W.2d 545 (1945) ; Note, "Use of Ex-
tra-Record Information in Custody Cases," 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 349 (1957). In absence of
statute the holdings in custody cases are either that reports cannot be used at all, or that
they must be disclosed unless the parties stipulate otherwise. See also note 87, infra.
In Tapscott v. Tapscott, 149 Cal. App. 2d 379, 308 P.2d 399 (1957), the stipulation pro-
vided for copies of the report to the parties and cross-examination of its author; he gave a
"detailed explanation" of it from the witness stand. Id. at 383, 308 P.2d at 401.
Despite opposition by social workers to disclosure in juvenile cases, the Community
Service Society of New York, a social casework agency, joined in recommending disclosure
in custody cases as well as cross-examination of the probation officer. See Special Comm. on
Ct. Reorg. of N.Y.C.BA. & Com. Serv. Soc'y, "Proposed Report on Family Court Act,"
app. p. 5 (1961).
84 See Matter of Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523, 526-27 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
973 (1955).
85 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244 (1949), held that a judge did not violate due
[Vol. 48
NEW YORK FAMILY COURT
ranting a different order of attention, in juvenile than in criminal pro-
ceedings: social data to determine treatment needs was visualized as the
mainspring of a juvenile proceeding, whereas social data was a late-
comer in criminal trials, already encrusted with precedent on sentencing.
Further, a juvenile proceeding is denominated, like a custody proceeding,
civil; and the judge's main concern is not punishment but the disposi-
tion conducive to the child's welfare, including the best hands to hold his
custody. Thus, both the "method of philosophy" and the "method of
sociology"" suggest a transfer of learning from custody to juvenile cases.
ADAPTATION TO JUVENILE CASES OF PRACTICES IN
CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS
In the prevailing view, including New York's, the courts countenance
complete confidentiality of the reports in custody cases if the parties so
stipulate.17 However, there is merit in the opposing stand that secrecy
cannot be stipulated."8 For, the purpose of disclosure is to check the
accuracy of the report to assure a valid determination, and courts re-
peatedly declare that the proper award of custody is a matter of public
concern. In any event, delinquency cases are in no sense private con-
troversies, and solving the disclosure question by stipulation would have
even less place than in custody proceedings.
More promising for juvenile cases, when full disclosure of the reports
process by considering background reports which had not been open to inspection by de-
fendant, in rejecting the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment and instead imposing
the death sentence. However, the Supreme Court noted that the trial judge had referred
to statements in the reports on which he was relying, and Williams did not challenge them.
As to disclosure of pre-sentence reports, see Wyzanski, "Trial Judge's Freedom and Re-
sponsibility," 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1291 (1952) ; Hincks, "In Opposition to Rule 34(c) (2),"
8 Fed. Prob. 3 (1944); Note, "Employment of Social Investigation Report in Criminal and
Juvenile Proceedings," 58 Colum. L. Rev. 702, 705 (1958).
For development of the doctrine that a discretionary determination is invalid if based
on irregular procedure or erroneous grounds, see Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539
(1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372 (1957); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80,
87-88 (1943).
86 Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 31-39, 66-72 (1921). See Matter of Rosmis,
26 Ill. App. 2d 226, 231, 167 N.E.2d 826, 828 (1960), where the Williams case, supra note
83, was applied in a juvenile proceeding involving custody, without mention of the dif-
ference in the nature of the proceedings.
87 See Kesseler v. Kesseler, 10 N.Y.2d 445, 180 N.E.2d 402, 225 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962), re-
manding custody case because the trial judge had considered psychiatric report which was
not covered by stipulation. The court disapproved the Herb decision, see note 81 supra,
where the stipulation technique had been rejected. On the Kesseler remand, the judge based
the custody determination largely on his conversation with the child, for which the parents
stipulated confidentiality. 149 N.Y.L.J. Jan. 8, p. 15, col. 2, 1963.
Upholding stipulations: Rea v. Rea, 195 Ore. 252, 245 P.2d 884 (1952); Crawford v.
Crawford, 256 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Onderdonk v. Onderdonk, 3 Wis. 2d 279,
88 N.W.2d 323 (1958). See Lawrence v. Hosfield, 51 Wash. 157, 316 P.2d 1102, 1103 (1957).
88 See Scott v. Cohn, 231 I1. 556, 83 N.E. 191 (1907) (cited with approval in Williams,
supra note 83): discretion as to custody must be based on evidence submitted in court and
subject to appellate review; "The agreement of counsel cannot bind as to the interests of
the minor." Id. at 559, 83 N.E. at 192.
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seems psychologically harmful, would be an adaptation of the view in
custody cases that the judge should use the report for leads in questioning
witnesses. In this way there is an opportunity for refutation and develop-
ment of information, and the social data is "woven into the fabric of the
record." '89 However, it seems unwise to insist, as some of the custody
decisions do, that the judge cannot rely on a reported fact unless there
is also "common law evidence" of it. 0
Assume that a probation report concerning a child's home discipline
relates information from a neighbor that he frequently comes home
after midnight. The judge believes that disclosure of the neighbor's
identity or even of the details of the report will destroy the neighbor's
beneficial relationship to the child. Under questioning by the judge the
child denies he keeps late hours, but the judge disbelieves him. If the
judge relies on the report without calling the neighbor or even the proba-
tion worker to the stand, he is obviously relying on a report of hearsay.
But the technique of exploring the issue with the child seems a tolerable
compromise.9 It is a compromise between the interest in accuracy and
exposing decision-influencing factors on the one hand, and the interest in
preventing psychological damage from full disclosure on the other. To
effect the compromise the judge must be allowed a measure of discretion.
But the statutory emphasis should be on disclosure rather than conceal-
ment, and the judge should be directed either to disclose the report or to
rely only on facts subjected to a courtroom check.
The social worker's recommendation-as distinguished from the back-
ground data he reports-or a physician's, psychiatrist's, or psychologist's
89 Fields v. Kaufman, 9 App. Div. 2d 375, 378, 193 N.Y.S.2d 789, 792 (1st Dep't 1959);
Schlanger v. Schlanger, 8 App. Div. 2d 801, 187 N.Y.S.2d 921 (1st Dep't 1959).
90 See Kesseler, supra note 87, 10 N.Y.2d at 454-57, 180 N.E.2d at 406-08, 225 N.Y.S.2d
at 8-10. Cf. Note, 10 Stan. L. Rev. 471, 495 (1958), as to admissibility of probation officer's
testimony. Compare practice in other proceedings of judge's calling expert investigator:
Beuscher, "The Use of Experts by the Courts," 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1107, 1117 (1941);
Note, 38 Colum. L. Rev. 369 (1938).
The common law rule against hearsay is disregarded under statutes and rulings that
permit reliance on background reports so long as they are disclosed. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 304
Mass. 248, 23 N.E.2d 405 (1939); Fewell v. Fewell, 23 Cal. 2d 431, 144 P.2d 592 (1943).
This practice is, as Professor Gellhorn points out, consistent with the traditional flexibility
of procedure in equity and habeas corpus cases. Gellhorn, Children and Families in the
Courts of New York City 333-34 (1954).
91 The manner and degree of disclosure can be adapted to the occasion without sacrifice
of a fair hearing. See United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953): sufficient to furnish
r~sum6 of adverse information with respect to status as conscientious objector to military
service.
Cf. Israeli practice of receiving evidence from victims of sex crimes by deposition to spare
them the embarrassment of testifying. Geis, "Juvenile Justice: Great Britain and California,"
7 Crime & Delin. 111, 114 (1961).
Compare State v. Reister, 80 N.W.2d 114 (N.D. 1956) where the testimony of adults to
whom young children had talked directly after a sex crime was received instead of the
testimony of the children.
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diagnosis, are not facts that the child or his parents are capable of deny-
ing or confirming (and their offering a contradictory expert is not a
practical possibility in most juvenile proceedings because of the family's
social and economic level). Thus, the disclosure of diagnoses or prognoses
or reference to them in questions, is not as vital to accuracy as in the case
of background data. However, whether or not the judge discloses these
expert opinions, he should check their reliability by questioning the child
and his parents at the least on the number and length of their contacts
with the diagnosticians. It may turn out that the diagnostician based a
very unfavorable opinion on a very fleeting contact.92
A direction to the judge to rely only on those factual statements in the
reports which, if not fully disclosed, have at least been subjected to the
test of courtroom questioning, imposes a sort of "honor system" on the
judge. But throughout the law we rely on the judge's sturdiness in
closing his mind to illegal entries.93 A courtroom screening of the reports
would give them a passably solid footing and would check their too-
casual acceptance.
PRIVILEGE FOR THE SOCIAM CASEWORKER
Quite a different issue of confidentiality is posed by the communica-
tions of the child or his parents to a social caseworker, as contrasted with
informants' statements about them. The latter information is destined for
the court, even though the informant may not want it revealed to the
parties. But the child and parents may make statements to a caseworker
that they want kept secret from all others, including the judge. Indeed,
the workers' success may in part be measured by the flow of such private
thoughts and feelings; by the degree of self-revelation. 4
Thus we have here the problem of confidentiality in the sense that
92 Matter of Torrans, 154 N.Y.S.2d 160 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1955): In a habeas
corpus proceedings, it appeared that psychiatric diagnosis of mother, which had been
a major reason for child's commitment, was formulated without any substantial contact
with the mother.
93 E.g., Matter of Brown, 201 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Matter of Bentley, 246
Wis. 69, 16 N.W.2d 390 (1944): hearsay would have invalidated juvenile adjudication if
there had been a jury, but it would be assumed judge did not consider it. Compare decisions
reversing convictions for contempt of court: "Weak characters ought not to be judges."
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 357 (1946). See also Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367,
376 (1947); see Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912-14 (1950) (opinion by
Frankfurter, J., on denial of certiorari).
94 Under the present New York legislation, these statements are covered by the provision
on nondisclosure of reports to the parties, but are not otherwise accorded confidentiality, nor
are statements made in the course of "informal" casework in intake; the only protection
here is that they cannot be used in an adjudicatory hearing or in a criminal case prior to
conviction, N.Y.F.CA. §§ 735, 834. However, statements made in the course of a marriage
conciliation effort cannot be used in evidence in any proceeding. N.Y.F.C.A. § 915. As to
such statements in California, see Note, "The Work of the 1939 California Legislature," 13
So. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 4-43 (1939); in England, Note, 23 Sol. J. 136, 164, 194, 219 (1956).
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underlies the common law testimonial privileges. The social value of
freedom to communicate-the justification for the testimonial privileges
-is highly compelling here, more compelling than in some of the
privileges now recognized by law.9 It is speculative whether husbands
and wives would confide in each other less if the testimonial privilege for
their confidential communications were abolished; or whether a patient
with a medical necessity for communication would withhold information
from a physician 6 In recent years statutes in a number of states have
created a testimonial privilege for newsmen, on the justification that the
flow of news would be encouraged by assurance to informants and news-
men that sources of information need not be disclosed in court. Here
again it is dubious whether the privilege actually produces greater ex-
pression of opinion."
In the case of a social worker in a juvenile case, his assurance to
the child and his parents that their confidence will not be revealed either
in reports or on the witness stand, would have an immediate and direct
effect on their feeling of freedom to communicate. And here there is no
other individual whose rights are adversely affected by according the
privilege, as there may be in other situations, for example, when a
defendant is refused information which would help in his defense or when
a victim of libel is unable to recover. A balancing of one right against
another would be required in determining whether to establish a general
testimonial privilege for social workers. But in our situation the issue is
only what is more helpful to the child-the judge knowing all his and his
parents' statements to the caseworker or their confidential relationship
with the worker.
The social worker-client privilege need not be accorded to every aspect
95 Freedom to communicate is the value underlying privilege in the sense of immunity
from liability for libel (see Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571-73 (1959); Handler & Klein,
"The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits Against Government Executive Officials,"
74 Harv. L. Rev. 44 (1960)), as well as privilege in the sense of freedom from compulsion to
disclose.
96 As to the testimonial privilege of a spouse, see Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1,
3-7 (1954); DeParcq, "The Upiform Rules of Evidence: A Plaintiff's View," 40 Minn. L.
Rev. 301 (1955); Note, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 126 (1958); of physicians, accorded by statute
in more than 30 states: Note, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 423 (1956). See Chafee, "Privileged Com-
munications," 52 Yale L.J. 607 (1943), casting doubt on the need for the physician-patient
privilege from the standpoint of encouraging communication.
97 See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958) ; Notes,
72 Harv. L. Rev. 788 (1959), 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 243 (1959). The newsman's privilege has
been accorded by statute in about a dozen states. New York now accords a privilege of
confidentiality to registered psychologists equivalent to the attorney-client privilege. N.Y.
Educ. Law, § 7611 (added by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956). See Louisell, "The Psychologist in
Today's Legal World: Part II," 41 Minn. L. Rev. 731 (1957). As to the related profession
of marriage counselling, see Comment, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 266 (1957). See also "A Critical
Examination of Some Evidentiary Privileges: A Symposium," 56 Nw. U.L. Rev. 206 (1961);
71 Yale L.J. 1226, 1254 (1962).
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of their communication but like the husband-wife privilege, only to
statements intended to be confidentialf 8 However, the distinction em-
ployed in the physician-patient privilege between diagnosis and treatment
would not be valid here, for the relationship with the caseworker should
be therapeutic from its commencement.9 9 Nor should there be reservation
about the privilege because the social caseworker is employed by the
court, rather than privately. A court-worker must be enabled to establish
the same full and therapeutic relationships with child and parents as the
employee of a private agency, else the purpose of expanding court services
cannot be fully fulfilled. 00
Evolving appropriate techniques for disclosure and confidentiality, will
be an important concern in all proceedings in the Family Court in New
York and elsewhere, as they come to rely more and more on social data.
A judge who is a propelling and guiding force in the extension of social
services in the New York courts foresees that:
This body of (behavioral) experts will develop increasingly the data bear-
ing upon issues .... Every indication confirms the future widening of
the breaches already made in the walls of the juvenile and family court-
room. . . . It will . . in my judgment, become necessary to distill
from our present rules of evidence evidentiary principles pragmatically
suited to the evolving procedures.'
98 The judge should give great weight to the social worker's view as to the confidential
intention. Guttmacher & Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law ch. 12 (1953), suggests ac-
ceptance of a psychiatrist's judgment on whether a statement to him was intended to be
confidential.
99 The privilege is accorded for statements made during psychiatric treatment, but not
during an examination to determine sanity or competence. In Taylor v. United States, 222
F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955), a problem was posed by a combination of the two functions;
the privilege was honored.
100 Young, supra note 69, at 59, 214, believes the client should realize that statements
to a court officer cannot be confidential. However, she points out that treatment starts
with the client telling his "story" to the social worker during the investigation.
Conn. Gen. Stats. 17-67 (1958), provides that conversations between the judge and the
child in juvenile proceedings are privileged.
101 Botein, "The Future of the Judicial Process: Challenge and Response," 15 Record of
N.Y.C.B.A. 152, 158-60 (1960).
